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INTEREST OF AMICI1
Amicus Brian Wolfman is Associate Professor of
Law and Director of the Appellate Courts Immersion
Clinic at Georgetown University Law Center (GULC).
For five years, he directed a GULC clinic that
represented Title VII plaintiffs and litigated the
question presented here: what types of employer
conduct and practices are prohibited employment
discrimination under Title VII. Amicus Aderson B.
Francois is Professor of Law and Director of GULC’s
Civil Rights Clinic. He litigates Title VII cases, and he
has written extensively on topics of racial justice.
Amicus Eric Schnapper is a Seattle attorney who
regularly represents plaintiffs in Title VII actions in
this Court and in the lower courts. He was counsel for
respondent in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Amici have a deep and abiding interest that Title
VII be interpreted to eliminate employment
discrimination in all of its forms, as demanded by the
statute’s text and purposes. Because the Fifth
Circuit’s decision below—which limits prohibited
employment discrimination to “ultimate employment
decisions” alone, Pet. App. 4a, such as those involving
hiring, firing, and compensation—flouts the text and
undermines Congress’s purposes, this Court should
grant review and reverse.

1

Counsel of record for all parties received notice at least
ten days prior to the due date of amici’s intention to file this brief.
The parties have consented to this filing. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than
amici, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. In Title VII disparate-treatment, employmentdiscrimination cases, the term “adverse employment
action” developed as judicial shorthand for the
statute’s text. But what started as shorthand has
taken on a life of its own and now improperly limits
the statute’s reach. The Fifth Circuit’s version of the
adverse-employment-action rule stands out as
especially improper: Only an “ultimate employment
decision”—a refusal to hire, a firing, a demotion, or the
like—constitutes impermissible discrimination. This
standard is inconsistent with Title VII’s text and this
Court’s precedent construing the statute.
II. The Fifth Circuit’s rule excludes many
discriminatory employment practices that are
unlawful (and, thus, actionable) in its sister circuits.
The stories of discrimination victims from these other
jurisdictions demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit’s
approach is wrong. These individuals suffered
discrimination that Title VII prohibits, but the Fifth
Circuit’s standard would enable their employers to
discriminate without consequence.
III. Consistent with Title VII’s text and this
Court’s precedent, an unlawful employment action is
any discrimination against the employee that can
properly be attributed to the employer. As long as the
employer’s intentional, discriminatory conduct
imposes meaningful harm on the employee, it is
prohibited by, and may be remedied under, Title VII.
ARGUMENT
Title VII prohibits disparate treatment by
employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. As reflected in the decision below, the
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Fifth Circuit’s longstanding view is that Title VII
disparate-treatment claims are actionable only when
the employer’s “adverse employment action” is an
“ultimate employment decision,” such as a refusal to
hire or a firing. Pet. App. 4a.
But the statute prohibits a far wider range of
employer practices affecting terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. Part I explains why that is
so, based on the statute’s text and this Court’s Title
VII precedents. Part II then shows, through a
discussion of decisions from other jurisdictions, that
the Fifth Circuit’s rule undermines Title VII’s broad
anti-discrimination purposes. Part III explains that
Title VII prohibits any intentional discriminatory
action taken by an employer that results in
meaningful harm to the employee.
I.

Title VII prohibits a broad range
discriminatory employment practices.

of

A. The term “adverse employment action”
started as useful shorthand for Title VII’s
text, but courts later gave the term an
impermissibly restrictive meaning.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it
“an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” because of that individual’s
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). This provision describes a broad
universe of prohibited employer practices commonly
referred to as “disparate treatment.”
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Early on, lower courts used the term “adverse
employment action” simply as shorthand for the wide
range of employment practices prohibited by the
statute. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980);
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296, 1297 n.7
(8th Cir. 1980). Leftwich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 470 F.
Supp. 758, 764 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
Over the ensuing decades, however, the courts of
appeals have allowed the term “adverse employment
action”—which appears nowhere in the statute’s
text—to take on a life of its own, giving it various
meanings that impermissibly limit Section 2000e2(a)(1)’s broad prohibition on discriminatory
employment practices. See Pet. 10-19 (describing
conflicting approaches taken in the circuits). Most
have added to the statutory language and held that
Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment protects
only employees who have suffered some sort of
economic harm. See Autumn George, Comment,

“Adverse Employment Action” How Much Harm Must
be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under
Title VII?, 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1075, 1083-96 (2009)
(surveying circuit-court decisions).
The Fifth Circuit has gone even further in
restricting Title VII’s scope. It recognizes as prohibited
only what it terms “ultimate employment decisions”:
“hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, granting leave,
and compensating.” Thompson v. City of Waco, 764
F.3d 500, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing McCoy v. City
of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2007)). As
we next show, that court’s strict limit on actionable
employment practices is inconsistent with Title VII’s
text and this Court’s precedent.
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B. Title VII’s text and this Court’s precedent
demonstrate that the Act prohibits a broad
range
of
discriminatory
employment
practices.
1. To understand the scope of Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination, we start, as we must,
with the statute’s text. Artis v. D.C., 138 S. Ct. 594,
603 (2018). Nowhere does Title VII use the word
“ultimate” to describe prohibited employment
practices. Nor does the statute otherwise narrow the
broad terms that Congress used to designate the
conduct that it proscribes and the harms it seeks to
redress. By construing the statute so narrowly, the
Fifth Circuit has effectively “rewrit[ten] the statute
that Congress has enacted.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 629 (2018).
a. As noted above, Title VII’s prohibition on
disparate treatment makes it unlawful to
“discriminate against” any individual in the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). By these words, the
statute limits the prohibited conduct to discrimination
based on certain expressly enumerated characteristics
of the individual (for instance, race and sex), but its
reach is not limited to any particular type of
discriminatory employer conduct.
The operative verb is “discriminate.” To
discriminate is simply “[t]o make or recognize a
distinction; to distinguish among or between;” or “[t]o
treat a person or group in an unjust or prejudicial
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manner.” Discriminate, Oxford English Dictionary.2
The statute thus encompasses “failure[s] to treat all
persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be
found between those favored and those not favored.”
Discrimination, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014).
Consistent with the breadth of the statutory term
“discriminate,” the statute’s drafters did not seek to
limit it to certain “ultimate” employer actions. Quite
the contrary. Senators Case and Clark, the managers
of the Senate bill that became Title VII, explained that
the statute “is clear and simple and has no hidden
meanings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or [to] favor … .” Title
VII, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n,
Legislative History of Titles VII and IX of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, at 3040 (1968) (CRA Hist.). Congress
viewed “discrimination in employment” as insidious
and thus designed the statute to secure “the
opportunity for employment without discrimination,”
and to “protect the right of persons to be free from such
discrimination.” H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 26 (1963)
(emphases added). If Title VII prohibited only
ultimate employment decisions, it could not fulfill
these purposes.
In sum, Title VII prohibits any differential
treatment by an employer against an employee
concerning what the statute calls “terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.” We now turn to that
phrase.

2

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54058?rskey=MoSQ9H&
result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid
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b. The statute’s ban on discrimination in “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” further
demonstrates that Section 2000e-2(a)(1) captures a
wide range of discriminatory employment practices,
not just those that result in “ultimate” employment
harms.
Start with “terms.” In light of the “specific
context” in which the word is used, Merit Mgmt. Grp.,
LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 893 (2018),
“terms” means “[p]rovisions that define an
[employment] agreement’s scope [or its] conditions or
stipulations.” Term, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014). In other words, “terms” are employment
“[c]ondition[s] under which something may be done,
settled, agreed, or granted.” Terms, Oxford English
Dictionary.3
Next, “conditions” means “[t]he circumstances or
factors affecting the way in which people live or work,
especially with regard to their well-being,” Condition,
Oxford Living Dictionary,4 or “[t]he whole affecting
circumstances under which a being exists,” Condition,
Oxford English Dictionary.5
And “privileges” means “right[s], advantage[s], or
immunit[ies] granted to or enjoyed by an
individual, … beyond the usual rights or advantages
of others; … exemption[s] from a normal duty,

3

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/199409?rskey=thMbUI&
result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid
4
5

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/condition

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/38550?rskey=0dQTWu&
result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid
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liability, etc.; [or] enjoyment of some benefit … above
the average or that deemed usual or necessary for a
particular group.” Privilege, Oxford English
Dictionary.6
Taken together, then, “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” include, at a minimum, any
characteristic of the employer-employee relationship
attributable to an employer’s conduct. Put another
way, the statutory phrase “terms, conditions, or
privileges” serves as a catchall for all of the daily
incidents of an employment relationship. After all,
“[w]hat more could be asked for in the way of
[statutory] guidelines, short of a complete itemization
of every [employment] practice which could
conceivably be a violation?” See CRA Hist. at 3096
(statement of Sen. Muskie). The Fifth Circuit’s
ultimate-employment-decision standard cannot be
squared with the statute’s expansive, unrestricted
language.
2. This Court’s precedent also shows that the
scope of the statutory prohibition—Title VII’s ban on
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment—is not limited to ultimate
employment decisions.
a. This Court’s early Title VII decisions
understood that the section of the statute at issue
here, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), “generally prohibits
racial discrimination in any employment decision.”
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796
(1973) (emphasis added). The statute’s primary

6

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/151624?rskey=WnLHFw
&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid
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purpose, this Court said, was to ensure “equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory
practices
and
devices
which
have … disadvantage[d] minority citizens.” Id. at 800
(emphasis added). Thus, “in enacting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit
all practices in whatever form which create inequality
in employment opportunity due to discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763
(1976) (emphasis added). The statute was not limited
to narrow categories of discrimination, this Court
observed, but rather was designed “to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment” in
employment. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). That is, “[t]he emphasis of
both the language and the legislative history of the
statute is on eliminating discrimination in
employment.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (emphasis added); see also
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796 (“[I]t is
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination.”).
b. This Court’s later sex-discrimination decisions
are to the same effect. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69 (1984), explained that “terms, conditions,
[and] privileges” of employment include any benefit
that is “part and parcel of the employment
relationship,” is an “incident[] of employment,” or
“form[s] an aspect of the relationship between the
employer and employees,” and may “not be doled out
in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer
would be free … simply not to provide the benefit at
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all.” Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted); see also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78
(1998) (confirming that the phrase “terms, conditions,
or privileges” is not limited in “the narrow contractual
sense”); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 64 (1986) (“the language of Title VII is not limited
to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination”). These
broad constructions of Title VII demonstrate that the
Act’s disparate-treatment prohibition cannot be
limited to ultimate employment decisions.
c. This Court also has recognized that severe or
pervasive sexual harassment, without more, affects
the terms and conditions of employment. See Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor, 477
U.S. at 73. So too with an employer’s failure to provide
religious
accommodations.
See
E.E.O.C.
v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028,
2033-34 (2015). An employer’s refusal to allow a
Muslim woman to wear a headscarf, for example, is,
without more, discrimination under Title VII even
when it is unaccompanied by an ultimate employment
action such as a refusal to hire or a firing. See id. The
reasoning of these decisions also shows that Title VII
proscribes far more than ultimate employment
decisions.
II.

The Fifth Circuit’s impermissibly narrow
ultimate-employment-decision
standard
authorizes discrimination that other circuits
rightly find actionable.

As the petition demonstrates, the circuits are
intractably fractured on what kind of employer actions
constitute impermissible discrimination under Title
VII. Pet. 10-17. Some require an ultimate employment
decision, see id. at 10-11, some do not, see id. at 12-14,
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and some ping-pong between the two rules, see id. at
16-17. Whatever the exact configuration of the
(undeniable) circuit split—which includes varying
formulations even among the circuits which reject the
Fifth Circuit’s approach, see id. at 12-16—one thing is
clear: Many courts of appeals condemn as
discriminatory under Title VII conduct that the Fifth
Circuit views as permissible.
The stories that follow are collected from
published decisions outside the Fifth Circuit. In each,
the court accepted the facts presented as true and then
determined, correctly in amici’s view, that the plaintiff
had suffered a form of discrimination prohibited by
Title VII even though she did not experience what the
Fifth Circuit views as an ultimate employment
decision.
A. Office settings and working conditions
The Fifth Circuit’s standard allows employers to
discriminate among their employees regarding
working conditions—even when they put employees at
risk of serious harm or render them unable to do their
jobs effectively. By contrast, in other circuits, this type
of discrimination is prohibited by Title VII.
• Firefighters Anne Wedow and Kathleen Kline
were issued “bunker gear,” safety equipment that had
to “fit properly to ensure that the body is protected
from injury due to smoke, water, heat, gasoline, and
chemicals and to ensure the mobility needed while
fighting a fire.” Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442
F.3d 661, 666-67 (8th Cir. 2006). But the Fire
Department issued them ill-fitting gear designed for
men. Id. The fire stations had “restrooms [that] were
located in the male locker rooms with the male shower
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room, doors were not secure, males had the keys, and
where female restrooms existed, they were unsanitary
and often used as storage rooms.” Id. at 667-68. The
Eighth Circuit upheld a jury verdict because “[t]he
record amply demonstrates that the terms and
conditions of a female firefighter’s employment are
affected by a lack of adequate protective clothing and
private, sanitary shower and restroom facilities,
because these conditions jeopardize her ability to
perform the core functions of her job in a safe and
efficient manner.” Id. at 671-72.
• Efrain Reynaga and his son were the only
millwrights of Mexican descent at Roseburg Forest
Products. Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847
F.3d 678, 683 (9th Cir. 2017). The two shared a locker
for their personal belongings, which they secured with
a lock. Id. at 684. One day, the police brought in dogs
to search for drugs. Id. Though Efrain offered to open
his locker, the mill owner broke the lock. Nothing was
found inside. Id. at 684. But when the dogs barked at
a white co-worker’s locker, the owner never opened it.
Id. at 693. The Ninth Circuit recognized this disparate
treatment as unlawful. Id. at 695.
*

*

*

The Fifth Circuit’s ultimate-employment-decision
standard would not recognize Ms. Wedow’s, Ms.
Kline’s, and Mr. Reynaga’s claims as actionable under
Title VII because their employers did not terminate,
refuse to compensate, or demote them. See McCoy v.
City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559-60 (5th Cir.
2007).
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B. Transfers and changes in duties or shifts
The Fifth Circuit recognizes transfers or shift
changes as ultimate employment decisions only when
they would have the “effect of a demotion or denial of
promotion” and the employee is placed in an
“objectively worse” position. Alvarado v. Texas
Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 613-614 (5th Cir. 2007). But
other circuits have recognized that discriminatory
transfers and shift changes can significantly affect an
employee’s terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment even when they are not ultimate
employment decisions.
• Dr. Carmen Rodriguez, a female junior-high art
teacher, was transferred to teach elementary school
students because the school district “wouldn’t have a
male grade school art teacher,” id. at 364, causing her
“severe professional … trauma.” Rodriguez v. Bd. of
Educ. of Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist., 620 F.2d
362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980). The school district explained
at the time that her transfer “does not and will not
diminish her salary; does not and will not reduce her
benefits, her seniority rights, or add any increased
load to her work performance.” Id. at 365. But the
“radical change” in the nature of her work still
“constitute[d] interference with a condition or
privilege of employment adversely affecting her
status” and was thus impermissible under Title VII.
Id. at 366.
• Robert Supinger, a white man, and his Korean
wife were the only couple against which the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles enforced its antinepotism policy. Supinger v. Virginia, 167 F. Supp. 3d
795, 804 (W.D. Va. 2016). When Mr. Supinger was
transferred as result of the policy, his daily commute
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time increased six-fold to three hours. Id. at 807. “The
inconvenience and expense caused by such a lengthy
increase in commute time [was] sufficient to cause a
significant detrimental effect on the terms and
conditions of Supinger’s employment.” Id. at 807-08.
*

*

*

Because transfers and shift changes are
actionable in the Fifth Circuit only when they are
objectively equivalent to a demotion, Dr. Rodriguez’s
and Mr. Supinger’s injuries would go unremedied if
litigated there. See Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 613-614.
C. Actions with
employment

consequences

for

future

• Noel Abboud was “the only employee of Arab
ancestry” at the Jamesville Correctional Facility.
Abboud v. Cty. of Onondaga, 341 F. Supp. 3d 164, 168
(N.D.N.Y. 2018). Mr. Abboud maintained that, as a
result of anti-Muslim bias, he was denied firearms
training, which did not limit his ability to earn
overtime, but made him ineligible for certain overtime
shifts. Id. at 173. He was also disciplined more harshly
than other employees for similar minor breaches of
protocol. Id. at 174. These discriminatory decisions
constituted unlawful employment actions under Title
VII. Id. at 179.
• Officers Bernadette Baltzer, Tricia Markham,
and Julie Rortvedt—Sun City’s only full-time female
police officers—saw special assignments given
exclusively to male officers. Baltzer v. City of Sun
Prairie Police Dep’t, 725 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-14 (W.D.
Wis. 1989). Though the court granted summary
judgment to the City on these claims because the
officers did not properly allege that they would have
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taken the special assignments given the chance, the
court never questioned that Sun City’s treatment of
the officers would be employment discrimination (and
thus actionable) if properly supported in the record. Id.
at 1026-28.
• Dr. Deepa Soni’s employer interfered with her
future job prospects. Soni v. Wespiser, 239 F. Supp. 3d
373, 378-81 (D. Mass. 2017). After suing her former
employer for race and gender discrimination, Dr. Soni,
an Indian neurosurgeon, twice sought employment at
other hospitals. Id. Although both initially expressed
interest in hiring her, neither did. Id. Her former
employer gave unsolicited, unfavorable references to
the other hospitals, suggesting that she would file
meritless discrimination charges. Id. Dr. Soni
maintained that her former employer’s discrimination
tarnished her reputation and deprived her of the two
jobs. See id. at 380-81. The court held that job
references are a privilege of employment that may not
be given on a discriminatory basis. Id. at 383.
*

*

*

Employees’ career prospects almost always
depend on establishing a good track record in their
current positions. But within the Fifth Circuit,
employers may discriminate in job responsibilities,
Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir.
2014), performance awards, and disciplinary writeups, see Puleo v. Texana MHMR Ctr., 187 F. Supp. 3d
769, 781-82 (S.D. Tex. 2016). See also Lopez v.
Kempthorne, 684 F. Supp. 2d 827, 885 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(same as to performance awards). In the Fifth Circuit,
the Sun City police officers, Mr. Abboud, and Dr. Soni
could not have pursued their Title VII disparate-
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treatment claims because their employers did not
discriminate against them in an ultimate employment
decision. For Dr. Soni in particular, her former
employer’s discriminatory job references would fall
short of the Fifth Circuit’s inflexible ultimateemployment-decision standard because the employer
who discriminated was not the employer who refused
to hire her.
D. Employment prerequisites
Shortly after Dr. Sagun Tuli, a female spinal
neurosurgeon, joined the hospital staff, a male
colleague, Dr. Day, began belittling female doctors.
Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 566 F. Supp.
2d 32, 38-39 (D. Mass. 2008), aff’d, 656 F.3d 33 (1st
Cir. 2011). He questioned Dr. Tuli’s skills and
judgment. Id. This mistreatment continued until Dr.
Tuli needed to be re-credentialed to continue working
at the hospital. Id. at 36, 43. Dr. Day was selected to
present Dr. Tuli’s case to the Credentials Committee.
Id. at 44. He said that Dr. Tuli should not be recredentialed because her “mood swings” made her
intolerable to work with. Id. at 45. Based on Dr. Day’s
presentation, the committee voted to re-credential Dr.
Tuli but only if she received a psychiatric evaluation.
Id. Requiring Dr. Tuli to receive an evaluation as a
condition of being re-credentialed was sufficiently
adverse to support her disparate-treatment claim. Id.
at 36-38, 59.
Dr. Tuli was denied a prerequisite to her
continued employment granted to other employees
without incident. In the Fifth Circuit, her employer
would have been able to delay, condition, or deny this
prerequisite on a discriminatory basis because those
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actions do not constitute ultimate employment
decisions. See McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559-60.
E. Leaving the workplace
After returning to work from her honeymoon
visibly pregnant, Alana Shultz’s boss told her she
would be fired. Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel
of City of New York, 867 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2017).
She was offered a six-week severance package in
exchange for “a complete waiver of her right to
commence an action for pregnancy or gender
discrimination.” Id. Ms. Shultz refused. Id. Three
weeks later, her employer reversed course, and she
kept her job. Id. at 301-02. But she had already
“experience[d] the dislocation of losing her
employment at a particularly vulnerable time.” Id. at
307. The court reasoned that Ms. Shultz’s employer
took an adverse employment action against her. Id. at
305. Because Ms. Schultz’s employer didn’t actually
fire her, whether its actions would be considered an
ultimate employment decision by the Fifth Circuit is
uncertain at best.
F. Disproportionately heavy workload
• Carlos Vega, a Hispanic high school math
teacher, was regularly assigned classes with more
Spanish-speaking students than were other teachers.
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72,
88 (2d Cir. 2015). It was “twice as much work” to
prepare for class. Id. at 76-77. The court found that
this discriminatory assignment was “more disruptive
than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities,” affecting the terms and conditions of
his work. Id. at 87.
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• Stephen Pothen, a maintenance engineer of
Indian descent, was also expected to do more work
than his colleagues. Pothen v. Stony Brook Univ., 211
F. Supp. 3d 486, 489-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). “[U]nlike
other engineers, he was at times not provided with a
utility assistant, requiring him to do the work of [an]
engineer … and assistant at the same time.” Id. at 49495. The court viewed this disparate treatment as
actionable because Mr. Pothen was given a
disproportionately heavy workload compared to his
similarly situated colleagues. Id.
• Christie Davis was the only female electrician
at her workplace. Davis v. Team Elec. Co.,
520 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008). Unlike her male
co-workers, she was often forced to work alone and
assigned the most hazardous work. Her supervisor
told her to do piping and ceiling work for weeks on end,
causing extreme neck pain. She was given a
“disproportionate number of jobs that entailed
working with Monokote, a hazardous material.” Id.
Though Ms. Davis’s onerous tasks were in her job
description, she suffered actionable discrimination
because “in the aggregate she was given a
disproportionate amount of dangerous and strenuous
work.” Id. at 1090.
*

*

*

The outcome below, in petitioner Peterson’s case,
demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit would hold that
the disparate treatment endured by Mr. Vega, Mr.
Pothen, and Ms. Davis is not prohibited by Title VII.
Mr. Peterson and other black employees maintain
that, on account of their race, they were required by
their employer to work outside in the heat, while white
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employees worked inside in air-conditioned comfort.
But according to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]aking this as
true,” they did not suffer discrimination under Title
VII. Pet. App. 4a.
III.

Title VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition
outlaws any discriminatory conduct or
practice attributable to the employer that
causes the employee meaningful harm.

As just shown, many courts view as
discriminatory under Title VII various employer
practices that would not be ultimate employment
decisions (and thus not actionable) in the Fifth Circuit.
But even circuits that have taken a broader view than
the Fifth have nonetheless restricted the statutory
prohibition against discrimination in a manner at
odds with Title VII’s text and purposes.
As discussed above (at 5), to discriminate means
simply “to distinguish between or among” people or
groups. See Discriminate, Oxford English Dictionary.7
And the phrase “terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment” includes myriad characteristics of the
employer-employee relationship. See supra at 7-8.
This Court should thus hold that Title VII means what
it says: Employers may not discriminate against their
employees with respect to any “terms, conditions, and
privileges” of employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, period.
Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any
individual” on the basis of certain characteristics. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). So a Title VII

7

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54058?rskey=MoSQ9H&
result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid
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plaintiff must show that the employer’s discrimination
harmed her. But the statute does not demand a
minimum
level
of
actionable
harm.
Any
discriminatory employer conduct that results in
meaningful harm to an employee—that is, harm that
a reasonable employee would view as negatively
affecting any of the circumstances of her
employment—is all that the statute requires. Cf. Wis.
Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S.
214, 231 (1992) (noting the traditional requirement,
inferable from any enactment, that de minimis
applications of a statute generally are excluded from
coverage).
This requirement of meaningful harm should not
be confused with a far greater requirement that the
employee show immediate economic harm, much less
the kinds of “ultimate” workplace harms that the Fifth
Circuit demands. As shown above (at 5-10), Title VII’s
text and history, and an unbroken line of this Court’s
precedent, contemplate no such restrictions. And as
the lower-court precedent reviewed in Part II
illustrate (at 11-19), many discriminatory employer
actions that have no immediate pocketbook impact
nonetheless impose serious harms on employees,
worsening their present-day workplace circumstances
and their future employment prospects.
Rejecting the lower courts’ atextual adverseemployment-action doctrine would not impose any
unreasonable obligations or litigation burdens on
employers, but, rather, would simply apply Title VII
as it was written and intended. Importantly, liability
for Title VII disparate-treatment discrimination will
still be limited to only those situations where the
plaintiff can prove that the employer intentionally
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discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. See Tex. Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). That is a significant
burden. See id. at 257-59; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993). And the harm
suffered by the employee must be attributable to the
employer based on principles of agency law and this
Court’s precedent. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). In sum, the
floodgates will not open, and the statute’s text and
purposes will be honored.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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